Illegal Migration in the Balkans: Whose Security Concerns?
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One of the most salient and most politicized aspects of globalization is the overall increase in the flows of human migration (Castles and Miller 2003). The so-called receiving states—usually advanced industrial democracies—have moved to put under control and restrict some of these population movements not only in order to curb their side-effects such as organized crime (e.g. human smuggling/trafficking) and terrorism, but also to protect the socio-political cohesion of their imagined communities. In the European Union and among its neighbours and future member states, repeated attempts have been made to coordinate and harmonize immigration control policies, particularly with respect to illegal and/or unwanted immigration.

According to more than a few observers (Doty 1996, Geddes 2000, Grabbe 2000, Emerson 2001, Mitsilegas et al 2003, Occhipinti 2003, Sherr 2000, Huysmans 2000, Ugur 1995, Weaver et al 1993), national and supranational policy-makers in the EU and its immediate neighbourhood have increasingly come to interpret most population movements in terms of the new security concerns, or the so-called “soft security challenges.”

In my paper, I will consider the place of the Balkans in the context of the security-migration link by looking at a seemingly simple question: who is the referent object of migration-related security concerns in the Balkans? That is, when it comes to migration, whose security concerns matter the most?

In addressing this question, I will focus on illegal migration. First, I will provide a broad overview of illegal migration and its flows in the Balkans and Europe. As I am yet to do any meaningful empirical research on the topic, I ask the reader to forgive the overly stylized reliance on anecdotes and journalistic accounts.

Second, I will discuss the ways in which illegal migration is commonly perceived at the elite and mass levels and will try to locate these perceptions in the context of “soft security challenges.” I will argue that while illegal migration is a security threat in terms of organized crime, the articulations of such threat should not be accepted as obvious and commonsensical. To explain this proposition, I will look at how the so-called war on human trafficking/smuggling can create a “siege mentality” in the EU in which all immigrants are presented in a negative light.

Third, and directly pertaining to the Balkans, I will try to show how this war on human trafficking/smuggling may be sold to the accession, candidate, and associate states and at what price.
The Fuse (Gori vatra, 2003), an award-winning film by Pjer Žalica, opens with a ‘soft security concerns’ theme. A local mafia boss somewhere in central Bosnia visits one of his field operations. His aide comes up to him and reports: “70 cases of Marlboro, 66 of Lucky Strike, 16 of those that I can’t pronounce, 7 Chinese and 9 Kurds.” He then turns to the “fresh goods from Serbia”: 6 trafficked women, ostensibly forced into prostitution. As the boss is explaining the rules of business to the women, a police car pulls over. The women, the Chinese, and the Kurds run for the woods. The boss stands unruffled. A police officer slowly approaches the boss.

The two of them shake hands. The police officer proceeds to inform the mafia boss that the illegal border crossing into Croatia had been arranged and then he goes on to personally inspect the migrants, especially the women. As the Kurds and the Chinese are taken into a lorry, the mafia and the police officer begin an elaborate financial transaction – paying one another in turn for various “deals.” In the last transaction, the boss hands out a bonus or tip to the police officer. The officer, visibly surprised, exclaims something like “oh, you shouldn’t have.”

Anecdotes about police corruption, smuggling of contrabands goods, and about human and sex trafficking are plentiful in the Balkans but very little systematic research has been conducted. Illegal migration, as a topic, is notorious for the lack of reliable data, which makes any analysis difficult. Before someone embarks on some hard-nosed field work (e.g. interviews, surveys government document research etc.), Balkan migration will be more or less exclusively studies through anecdotes, newspaper clippings and such. It should be clear that this paper is not about the migration – illegal and legal – as the result of ethnic wars in the former Yugoslavia. To me, this is a special topic which asks for a special treatment (see, e.g., Crnobrnja 1997, Van Selm 2001).

Illegal migration has a long and sordid history in slave trade (Weiner, 1995: 7-8; later in the movie, the mafia boss’ aide says to his acquaintances: “I am busy; I am shifting these white slaves.”). Human trafficking and smuggling—the terms that dominate in the discourse on illegal migration today—are often used interchangeably, even though one can ascertain a difference in the legal language Salt and Hogarth 2000: 18-24; Migration News Vol. 8: 11). A trafficker is anyone involved in the recruitment, transportation, and harbouring of people when force, coercion or threat is used by someone who has authority over the victim (EU Justice Minister Framework Decision; MNews Vol 9, No 2). Sex trafficking – trafficking women for prostitution – is an area of illegal migration that has recently received some attention in the Balkans (e.g. the “Moldavka” affair in Montenegro in 2003; various incidents involving SFOR soldiers in Bosnia).

A smuggler can be said to be anyone fitting the first part of the definition only. But as with all legal definitions concerning migrants of the various migration status (economic migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, those seeking family reunification, those
trafficked or smuggled etc.), there are considerable difficulties in differentiating one from another.

Migration is often explained by the so-called push-pull factors. Push factors include violence, persecution, famine, demographic pressure, scarce economic opportunities, environmental degradation etc. Pull factors are better economic opportunities, greater security etc. Important is the working age dependency ratio. The EU, like a number of other advanced industrial communities, has a low birth rate and a high standard of living. As most of the remaining world consists of countries with high birth rates and low standard of living, high incentives exist for the migration into the affluent transatlantic community. These incentives come in addition to the time-honoured push-pull mechanisms.

Another factor, which straddles the push-pull divide is the rise of migration mafia, which capitalizes on a “low risk, high gain” nature of the job (e.g., Mandell 1999). Some estimate that human trafficking business is the fastest growing criminal business in the world; according to others, it has now surpassed the drug smuggling as the most profitable organized criminal activity.

It is estimated that some 500,000 people enter the EU illegally every year (MNews 9:3). IOM estimates that there are 5 million “undocumented” foreigners, in addition to 26 million total in the EU (5% of the EU’s population before the enlargement). The issue has gained headlines in the recent years, following a series of tragedies in which illegal migrants were found drowned in the Adriatic (or in the Sava river like in Zalica’s film) or dead on the cargo containers at Dover.

In the same period, the member states have been trying to bust the transnational criminal networks, only to find that the business has been steadily expanding. David Wilson, head of intelligence for the UK immigration services, notes another problem: “The harder we make it, the more lucrative we make it for organised gangs.” (The Guardian Weekly 12-4-2001: 21). It is often stipulated that unlike with drugs, where monolithic, hierarchical cartels rule, in the realm of trafficking networks, business is conducted through sub-contracted freelancers, which makes the bosses virtually untouchable.

2. MIGRATION AS A SECURITY THREAT

International migration used to be explained within a political economy framework. But following the end of the Cold War, the question of what may constitute (national) security threat began to be considered from different perspectives. Thus in the 1990s migration become a prominent security issue. Robert Mandell (1999) situates the phenomenon of illegal migration within a more general picture of “ominous covert transnational flows” which have adverse effects on national and international security.
Instead of delving deep into the concept of security and how it relates to the object of security,¹ let me just say that non-traditional or soft security concerns – terrorism, drug trafficking, corruption, environmental degradation etc – are not new issues per se, but they have taken on a new saliency. Changes in the object and the conceptualization of security imply that the “subject,” or at least the security instruments are also changing. A standing army and military alliances are losing saliency, as national security is increasingly defined as the ability of the government to control entry and exit over its boundaries – physical or cultural. The nature of some of these new threats requires that they are met through broad-based, cooperative effort on the part of governments, non-governmental organizations and interests groups, epistemic communities and such.

For the sake of brevity, I cannot recount various studies which have examined the critical questions: when and why do receiving states of the EU perceive threats from migration; and how do governments react to these perceptions. Instead, let me zoom in on a significant concept/theory introduced by the so-called Copenhagen School of security studies—that of securitization (Buzan et al., 1998).

When something is securitized it means that it is made into a security problem or a threat, which, in turns, means that emergency, exceptional and/or extraordinary measures can be employed to combat it – such as the exclusive claim on social resources (e.g. greater police budgets), suspension of civil liberties (e.g. secrecy, conscription) and even use the military against its own citizens – all in the name of national security. The state seems to be seen as the primary unit with the authority to enact and implement these measures: “[i]n naming a certain development a security problem, the ‘state’ can claim a special right…Power holder can always try to use the instrument of securitization of an issue to gain control over it.”²

This implies that a development, such as (illegal) immigration, can be considered to be beyond politics, an issue that requires an immediate policy response (Buzan et al 1998: 23-26), such as a specific refugee policy or, in this case, a war on illegal migration (smuggling/trafficking). Policies that stem from securitization, are not up for debate and those who like to think otherwise may be labeled as ridiculous or even disloyal and traitorous. What I want to stress that securitization is a socially constructed process; any attempt to classify types of threats from migration runs into distinction between the real and the perceived.

According to the Copenhagen School, the key to this distinction is held by the state power holders – government and governing elites. The invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force. The securitization approach shows, I think, not only how certain issues become security issues, but also how some issues in the security discourse writ large become more salient than others.

It is perhaps safe to say that migration poses a threat to what has been defined as societal security. In other words, what may be called the contemporary ‘possibility criterion’ of security is societal identity: “A state that loses its sovereignty does not survive as a state; a society that loses its identity fears that it will no longer be able to live
Here, national identity can be seen as the principal referent object of security, the thing to be secured. In the West at least, I propose, the object of security has spread from state to nation, from sovereignty to identity (Weaver et al. 1993; for America, see the most recent work by Samuel Huntington). Like nation or national security, national identity is a construct; it implies belonging to an imagined community. The influx of foreign individuals and groups affects patterns of this construct; it threatens the “socio-political cohesion” of the state, which consists of its political authority (e.g., control of borders) and its ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic fabric. National identity is multifaceted and vague and it customarily defies positivistic attempts to somehow measure it, but one can recognize its primary construction sites, i.e., key political and social institutions, such as government, intellectuals and media (e.g., Doty, 1996). Hence the focus on elite discourse.

In the West, immigration is seen as necessary for all kinds of reasons. But while the necessity for migrants is widely recognized, it is the prospect of “unwanted” human influx to which the affluent, receiving states react by constructing legal and physical barriers to entry. Therefore, when discussing migration as a threat, one has to focus on illegal migrants (those smuggled or trafficked), refugees and asylum seekers (unwanted), while keeping in mind that legal immigrants (wanted) themselves can also be, for all intents and purposes, securitized.

But in the eyes of the citizens of the receiving states, this distinction is blurred: for the receiving society in general, immigrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers can all be perceived as foreigners whose presence threatens the receiving state and its society. The receiving states, or in this case, societies, are likely to raise social barriers against newcomers and engage in the politics of exclusion. Huysmans (2001: 757) argues that migration was securitized in the EU on three grounds: 1) internal security (e.g., terrorism); 2) cultural security (see above section on society and identity); and the “crisis of the welfare state” (e.g., citizenship). In each area, he finds evidence that migration is grouped together with crime and terrorism. So not only are migrants of all categories problematically grouped together, migrants are also grouped together with dangerous elements such as terrorism.

The point I want to make is the following: war on smuggling/trafficking has a potential of criminalizing immigrants writ large, illegal and legal, wanted or unwanted. The term ‘framing’ is appropriate here: the governments in the EU are producing a particular frame within which to interpret certain phenomena (as in preferring one kind of discourse; e.g., security; political psychology also talks about framing).

This point does not imply that the evidence of security threat that come though illegal immigration is false; rather, it means that the articulations of threat should not be accepted as obvious and commonsensical. Trafficked women who are forced into prostitution, instead of being considered victims of crime, are often addressed as undocumented migrants who are engaged in criminal activities and are arrested, imprisoned and deported. Often, these are the sole arrests and punishments made in anti-
trafficking operations. For these and similar reasons, securitization of migrants should be closely scrutinized.

Before I move on, I should like to stress that I do not argue that there is no threat from illegal migration whatsoever; clearly, we are talking about a crime. I simply want to demonstrate why elite and public discourse on migration in the EU may be problematic. Migration itself is not a crime; on the contrary, if we are to believe numerous international treaties and conventions, the UNHCR, Amnesty International and other institutions with similar mandates, migration is to be associated with human rights and democracy.

3. WHOSE SECURITY?

“Europeanization” is everywhere, we all talk about it at this conference. The way I see it, Europeanization can be conceived as a gradual loss of societal control – exercised through, say, national legislatures – over the executive’s decisions.6

In the EU, a polity of considerable democratic deficit, dimensions of immigration policy that go under the “justice and home affairs” pillar. After Amsterdam, Nice, Laeken, migration has become firmly securitized as a potential soft security threat and the protection of human rights and civil liberties of immigrants has been placed on a backburner. The “asylum shopping” has been prevented not just in the EU, but also in the wider Schengen area. For example, eight EU nations, Ireland, Denmark, Belgium, Finland, Spain, Sweden, Britain and Portugal - have enacted common rules for acquiring refugee status and procedures for processing asylum requests by the January 1, 2004 deadline (MNews 11:1).

Similarly, the safe third country agreements have been signed with almost all candidate countries (Lavanex 2001) and some non-candidate countries. The European Commission in November 2003 announced its first readmission agreement with a European country far outside the EU, Albania. Under the agreement, unauthorized Albanians as well as foreigners who transited Albania en route to the EU will be returned to Albania. There are similar readmission agreements with Hong Kong, Macao and Sri Lanka, and readmission agreements are being negotiated with Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, Algeria, China and Turkey. Turkey is thus the only EU accession candidate without such an agreement (Mnews 11:1).

At Tampere (October 1999), the EU arrest warrant was introduced: courts no longer need to verify whether a fugitive from Portugal is also punishable in Sweden, and hence extraditable. The EU responses to 9/11 removed any remaining restrictions on the extradition. The Europol has standardized the safeguards of the storage, exchange, and analysis of personal data, which means that countries like the UK, Ireland had to adopt the lower, continental standard (Occhipinti 2003).

It is probably safe to say that Europol and the British Home Office now act as one of the main watchdogs in charge of curbing illegal immigration in Eastern Europe (The
HO has set up offices in Vienna, Rome, Prague, Budapest and Zagreb). The plan for a Europe-wide (meaning the EU plus the applicant countries) crackdown was drafted and approved at the Laeken Summit in December 2001. It calls for the coordination of visas, border controls, repatriation and readmission policies, police cooperation and intelligence sharing (including Europe-wide arrest warrants – effective from 2003; common definitions of terrorist etc.). The plan is a part of the larger project—initiated in Amsterdam in 1997—agreed upon by the governments of the member states of the EU to try and harmonize their justice and home affairs, that is, their security, asylum, refugee, and immigration policies (see, e.g., Mitsigelas 2003).

So far, the “war” has been successful for the EU. The figures for asylum seekers in the EU are down from 370,000 in 2002 to 288,000 last year (22%). The UK Home Secretary, David Blunkett, said: “These figures show very significant progress has been made in dramatically reducing the number of asylum seekers entering the UK” (BBC 2-24-2002). The Europeanization of justice and home affairs matters has weakened citizens’ rights, but has also arguably given some benefits (more security, however defined). This is the old story of the freedom vs. security trade off.

But what does this all mean for the Balkans? In the EU, the word ‘Schengen’ has come to symbolize a systematic attempt to, on one hand, to abolish internal borders and facilitate the mobility and, on the other hand, to strengthen the outer border and curb the illegal migration and other forms of transnational crime. Unlike the freedom part, the security part of Schengen (border control culture which includes visas, random checks and a siege mentality) is being exported to the accession countries, even though it is almost certain that such extension of Schengen eastwards will break socio-economic and political ties across accession and non-applicant countries (Grabbe 2000).

Suffice it to say, the EU has all the structural power in this case: the applicants must accept Brussels definition of ‘Europe’, without being able to influence its formulation in any way. The applicant countries have no rational choice: they have latched onto the EU’s restrictionist agenda (and accepted the “Fortress Europe” “siege mentality”). So by accepting the war on illegal migration, the applicant states have even less ability to argue that the EU border policies are an obstacle for constructive engagement: cross-border cooperation (local economic infrastructure, minority relations) and ‘good neighbourly relations’.

In the case of the “stabilizing” institutions and policies such as enlargement (e.g. SAP), the Stability Pact for SEE, etc, the extension of Schengen to Hungary and Slovenia, will render the efforts of the Pact irrelevant and/or counterproductive. ‘Schengenization’ of Eastern Europe adversely affects the stability of the continent (OSCE’s main mission, for example). Thus, Grabbe is right to say that the EU’s internal and external security policies stand in stark contradiction. As I said, the applicant countries have no choice: the trade off between the openness with the Eastern neighbours and the integration with the Western ones, swings in the favour of the latter.
One more angle to the “whose security” question. I heard a number of people say that illegal migration (e.g. Kurds, Chinese) is not, strictly speaking, a Balkan problem. The Balkan states are transit countries, not receiving ones. But illegal migration cannot be decoupled from other security concerns, such as corruption and organized crime, and in the Balkans there is simply too much corruption and crime per square kilometer. Illegal migration, at a minimum, contributes to the weakness and failure of the Balkan state.\(^7\)

Besides, the Balkans are increasingly becoming a destination for migration. Estimates of “permanent” Chinese population in Bosnia range from 2,000 to 10,000 and in Serbia and Montenegro from 10,000 to 40,000. Will Balkan societies resist the urge to frame such permanent migration in terms of identity threat?

CONCLUSIONS

Synthesizing the theoretical propositions and empirical illustrations presented here, a few concluding observations emerge about the war on illegal migration in Europe. These observations are extremely tentative. First, even though only a small fraction of migrants warrants securitization, it appears that it is the securitizing discourse paints an inaccurate and politically dangerous picture in which all immigrants are seen as a possible threat (and such discourse plays right into the hands of the right-wing forces). The securitization analytic framework allows us to analyze when there is an overreaction to migration-related security. Clearly, mistaking migrants for terrorists is wrong. What is overlooked is that most international migrants are innocent of anything at all and are, in the case of refugees and/or those being trafficked, extremely vulnerable.

Second, it seems that the EU has chosen the Schengenization/enlargement policy over the one emphasizing a Europe-wide stabilization. Its plan to securitize the eastern border is short-sighted and may adversely affect the relations between the various Eastern European states. As I said, the applicant countries, on their part, have no real choice; it is to be expected that all of them will sacrifice the ties with the east to get integration with the west and thus become the “buffer zone for immigration” (Grabbe 2000: 527).

Third, the need for secure travel documentations and robust border regimes is gradually being accepted on a wider scale. But the logic that underpins many of these restrictions, including the war on human trafficking/smuggling, is one that systematically evades accountability and engagement with the so-called root causes of this illegal migration phenomenon. And here I mean, the humanitarian and preventive ventures involving burden-sharing or balance of efforts understood in a broad sense, such as the various migration-related programs under the Stability Pact for SEE, which aim to stabilize (illegal) migrant-producing regions and harmonize efforts to combat human smuggling/trafficking.

It should be said that the EU is trying to encourage cooperation from emigration countries to minimize irregular migration, in principle if not in practice. In October 2003,
the Commission said: “If carefully managed, migration can be a positive factor for growth and success in developing countries. One of the basic principles of improving the management of migration is that it requires joint effort. Dialogue between the country of origin and the countries of destination needs to be intensified and cooperation needs to be developed in a spirit of partnership” (EC website, April 2004).

The current wave of restrictionism not only has slim chances of curbing illegal immigration, but it contradicts the EU’s self-identity. Christina Boswell has argued that ‘Schengenization’ of the applicant countries renders a great many of ‘European values’ invisible: “The self-proclaimed liberal democratic and human rights-based values underpinning the European project were being threatened by the resurgence of exclusionary forms on nationalism and ethnocentrism.”

Finally, our predominant normative ideals – almost all of them of the nation-state communitarian sort, need to be reexamined if we are to regulate, that is, live with the increase in all sorts of human mobility. If indeed migration has become a “postnational social form” (Appadurai 1996: 4, 33-4), then it surely warrants postnational policy responses, in the form, say, of international migration regimes or bodies that could provide assistance for smuggled and trafficked migrants before their status can be resolved. Unlike refugees, and perhaps since July 2003, migrant workers, who today have some kind protection under international law and norms, victims of smuggling and trafficking have none.
Bibliography


NOTES

1 The traditional focus of strategic studies is centred on external political-military threats whereby the principal referent object and subject of security is the state. According to this approach, security is strictly related to military defence and the use of force and is often described as hard. Themes such as state power, territoriality, material interests, armaments, war strategies and tactics, to cite just a few, form the analytical landscape. All of these themes derive from the concept of state sovereignty. Much of modern Western political thought regards the sovereign state as the only legitimate monopoly-holder over the legitimate use of force as well as over the legitimate (human) movement; it provides a solution to the problems of collective action and political order, establishing the conditions for uncontested authority over time and within a particular space. The sovereign state, therefore, is historical and territorial. Through the idea and practice of citizenship, the sovereign state defines the political subjectivities. All disputes within a particular space can only be resolved by a legitimate sovereign power. On the level of the state system, too, disputes are to be handled by a legitimate sovereign power or powers, whereby because of the anarchical nature of such system, legitimacy is simply determined by state power (‘might makes the right’).

This account is contested on several grounds. The state sovereignty is a social construction, constructed not least by those who are most talking about it: government officials and social scientists. But there are other political subjectivities. International relations do not only consist of state relations, but of relations of many non-state identities, so to speak. A claim can be made that security threats do not concern states per se, but to communities and individuals, which in turn may be seen as living within these borders. The actor who identifies the threat does not necessarily have to be the state; in fact, threat can be defined by an individual or a group and it can be the state, that is social hierarchies within it. A state’s labour policy, for example,
can be seen as threatening to human security of women as workers (Chin 1998; Prügl 1998; Whitworth 1994; for a different analysis of the state as a threat, see Ayoob 1999). Of course, one should be careful about blowing out the concept of human security to include all threats – such as smoking or jaywalking.

2 Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in Ronnie Lipschutz (ed.), On Security (New York, 1995), 60. I am not going to go into detail here, but it is important to note that the process of securitization is a speech act – the utterance of threats is the act of securitization, whereby an issue is established as existentially salient (threatening) with a salience sufficient to have political effects. “To identify someone or something as the referent object of security, as the person or thing to be secured, is to empower them.” p. 97. David Mutimer, “Beyond Strategy: Critical Thinking and the New Security Studies,” in Craig Snyder (ed.), Contemporary Security and Strategy (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1999), 89-90. Conversely, and the way I see it, to identify someone or something as a threat is to greatly disempower them.

3 Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in Ronnie D., Lipschutz, (ed.) On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 67. Waever goes on to contend that, with the EU context, the exclusive, sovereign, territorial state is being weakened. Here, the idea and practice of citizenship can be seen a method of securitization; after all, citizenship was an extension of legal and social rights and duties onto the nation (which, in turn, was constructed against the ‘other’). See, Irene Bloemraad, “Citizenship and Immigration: A Current Review,” Journal of Migration and Integration 1:1 (Winter 2000), 11. For the sake of brevity again, my look at the relationship between national security and citizenship will remain cursory.

4 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear, 47. An important caveat: in any theory of social identity, there is a theoretical and methodological problem “in generalizing from the individual out to the group.” William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), 76. Also, see Alexander Wendt, “The State as a Person” (forthcoming). I should like to note that the securitization school has been called “slippery, contradictory” and otherwise untenable by some; for a discussion, see Buzan and Waever (1997). For, a critique by feminists – “speech-act theory presupposes the existence of a situation in which speech is indeed possible,” see Hansen (2000: 285).

5 Yannis A. Stivachtis, “Kosovar Refugees and National Security,” Refuge, 18:3 (August 1999), 42; Nevertheless, if one focuses on the security of the refugees or goes beyond state-centered consideration of threat perception, the importance the distinction between refugees and economic migrants becomes necessary: “an economic migrant still has the citizenship and protection of his or her state of origin; a refugee enjoys no such protection.” Van Selm, “Kosovo Refugees and the EU,” 48. The point is that the emerging migration regime in the EU can be interpreted through the securitization lenses. The decisions on migration have largely taken place behind the closed doors, usually in the conventions of the interior ministers (Lavenex, 1999), esp. now that the migration regime falls under the first pillar.

For an excellent account on how this move increases securitization capacity both within and outside the EU, see Huysmans (2000) and Theodora Kostakopoulou, “The ‘Protective Union’: Change and Continuity in Migration Law and Policy in Post-Amsterdam Europe,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 38:3 (September 2000), 497-519. For a not-so-excellent case study on the securitization of Bosnian and Kosovar refugees in Germany, see Srdjan Vucetic, “Migration and National Security: A Look at the Berlin Republic,” unpublished paper, 2001. In this paper, I show that German and, indeed, the EU’s refugee regime on former Yugoslavs in the 1990s can be characterized by containment, temporary protection, and assisted repatriation. These policies have allowed that state to dodge their “responsibilities” towards refugees and asylum-seekers.

6 This can be explained in at least ways. First, the supranational agenda is set by the national governments (Moravcsik 1998, 2002), esp. with when it comes to justice and home affairs. Second, once the agreements are signed and/or ratified, they locked-in, which means that parliaments and publics find it costly to seek change. Third, executives have better information access and, fourth, are able to “frame” an issue which is difficult to change (see above).
7 They may even be seen as quasi states—states which “possess the same external rights and responsibilities as all other sovereign states...[but whose] governments are often deficient in the political will, institutional authority, and organized power to protect human rights or provide socio-economic welfare.” Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, IR, and the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press*, 1990, 21; Also see Ayoob (1999).